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ABSTRACT
PECUNIARY AND MARKET MEDIATED EXTERNALITIES:
TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF THE WELFARE
ECONOMICSOF ECONOMIES WITH IMPERFECT
INFORMATION AND INCOMPLETE MARKETS
This paper presents a simple but quite general framework for analyzing
the impact of informational externalities.By identifying the traditional
pecuniary effect of these externalities which nets out,the paper greatly
simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions can be Pareto
improving. Ii some cases it also leads to simple tests, based on readily
observable indicators of the efficacy of a particular tax policy.The
framework of the paper is used to analyze adverse selection, sigri111ng,
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A Ignifirzmt pcriim I the reccnt literatwe in public finance has be devc*ed toUt analyth cf
newlydscovad atutia]it in markets with impeitct infcrmatiaa Signalling (s e e Spe
(1973)), search (see flamini and Maskin (1979), Mcrtenscn (1979)),and imuraxe (see Shavdl
(1979)) dated atataUtia are all in pcint. lh each htazte the papers inVdVCd attempt
first to 5tablish the amer d a "maT" tnality az then to detop a prtipt1m for welfare
improving go'nnment interventicz5. In mat d the literatwe ndt&r d the steçs is straight-
forward. Yet tlcc is a framework devdoin this papa, th readily identific rea1"
unliti (i.e. thae bdling to bWI5dit marks taiioz) aS! pro'Ades simple rcrip&ns,
LnsS m cSaiable indirnán, for the apjrcpriate thrm Cf gounnent intervention.
Ccncan with wSt infamaticn based externalitis are "iS" sm to be rated in the lccg,
ixitnow alnnt cknant,traãticn cf analyzing the sixial impact d an indhidual's acticns in taics
1 pecuniary aS nan-pecuniaq atanalities; 'with the latter lxing "ri" atutalida Mich justify
govnnezfl Servaidra The zaonimpact cf p&uthaxy atniit (i.e. the nu!uar cf an
thdisithia]% imct m ti tiraigh his imnrt ni mark ptic) is thai ascribed, if aily
Fwrialqpxt cidieNatimal Scieme FaSadon is gatthally athtedged. Earlia iwa<1this pa tre
çreserrel at scinam at Prin Hanni, Kmixtdy Sct, aSLSEWe are irxithtedrsxtidifls at Sse
Tthta1farhdpM armvnt-2-
infnally, to the fact that as tim number ci ageit in an ecmany Lnxnies large, the Wect ci a
single in&idual a! market detnined variables, like prices, becomes negligible. Consequently,
these n an be ignaed in making well are calculafions. The implicit concern in the literature
seem to be that, in atomistically corupetithe nomics, uth market- ar.ediaS ettanalitiesmay
be nligiWe for similar reasot (Inc the we cith which the literature examines uniting cases
'isith large nuts ci agents). Hawe%vr, as this jrper makes dear, pecuiiary attnalitin in tIe
sense arc a wry spial case aM market-mediated aternalities are in geinal entirely
ana!cgcus to taditional atnlities (e.g. air pcllution).
There are, however, pctmiaiy n with arise fran any gatnmmt interveaticn ad these do
i&d itt at in welfare calculations far atcnnistically mnpetitiw eccnanics. The aplexity d
many nalyses ci m_adonal atcialilies is then affiuixatable to a failure to identify and
eliminate these tenn.' Thing so within the framework destope3 in this paper provides an apprcech
which substantially thrplifia the analysis ci the apprcpriate nature Cf gO'i'imit intervciticn in
inçerfectly infcnnth market wrni,ies?
lit papa csts cf two sections and a brid amduthon. Section 1 develop the lsic
framewixk aM anal)t Section II then uses this formulation to investigate a brad range ci
welfare dtuaticx in which market-me*fatui atemalities play an important role. It analyses the
lcral welfare impliatia5 if adverse selection, signnTflng, moral hazard, brcrnplete markets and
queueraliothng equilibria.
LThaBIcModdwxIR5ub
lit agents in the nithel contht 1 lnsseltlth, firms, aM a genment with the fdkming
drarat
1. See dtlr the liteatwe ciserthctcsaciit' eg Mmsm (1979) a rtammd ath Maskin (1979) -ad ci
isrcqteseactdes rmthcs -tgtflmrnd(1967)a Lccng ard Zeckhause (1981). In gaI, dt atç!Sty cf
de amty!es arise teuse dc a2ts mutate cicaqaiirrdevant trarginal rats cf sibttaici a frnsork,
wtich nka it dthAtt w i&xtfy dt fa"u' jmzilaiy ecrcnalitiu cdth ittat.
2.M liqntn aspcc if Ut çpcath is that it itrifi5 eaenatitia 'Mth de t tear the brdri rat than thcse




x'. =(x,%h) —CcnsumpticnwctT cf IEUSdIcIdh,ztbccinsumption c( dmnumaáegocx1, x =(x, x)isax3umptiondtheN-1nofl-xIuffler3fregocds,
vect 1 Nh t variables v1ñth aff the utility cf bausthold Ix (c.& levels
cf pcihthai, avatge quality cf a —ccinsnd).









E"(q,?, u) -tS apethtwefuzrthn ct bousthdd Ix th gives t!tnñzñmmnexpmcflture
rnsary to thain a level cf utility u1, ta prices areq and z' is level cf
'almr" variables.
It is nll-bain that,






We will autmie that this fturticn is cEffnttiable.4
tklrna
Firms rnaximfre the profit itmcti cn,
y1(y,f') -ct&dfirthfsithy{andj" tdanaicgwsiyto4 and
p —Vtcrcf prothicms' prices icrtimN—1non-nmnnairegoals.
Firms mathnize prcñt subject to tim cortraint that,
-a iuxttia *1 tim tsual sort,
S- vnciabaNvariablesaffting fixmfanalcgasslydefrwi to?
litfirm'smniirnt1 fuxticn,
has tim jctythat,
3. lIt luisdr4d &mand fmdai ciJs 01 the true swa ci t!nfas tatebibz
Ftadz?(shith
thexdneci', ii' and in hcssthdd Sate) raydjrrxia the anizptim ddcesCfd& Lnist2th.In
aput athaxe cm.
xA(q,fl.x*(q,Ih;:*(q,fl)%tmex*(q,1;1)iSttuSflldafldtunaitieStkZ"asfiXS.AIso,fadtsake
cfpcüdanlsrxçlidty, lnzsdrld In ocbcrtu base Its aztharily at win This hn m subsazrin inpa
mdt aSys.
4.lIt ptlieinCf sifying ts kind Cf dffrrSabi]ity assurqt is aatnS in tal ty Stmts (1980) nIt
•a
tilt awnjnin a slighdy dfSet .lit df5ailty theis thatthe 'sal anvecity asunpdot Cf
pefeerza aid pvdictai fuixdasnilguaran dffeaiability. The atcal deco tray acredscciziaiides.
lit excess nd' ftmaia% tned the SLide the df ci mqian€tiestubdrealyarid ithrecdy ia tir
m cinlity gtaañag acisiS (it. ftwgb fit inpact d/ aid g*)nlithin win,df mwuvrr1Q1aid —
5. )'(<Oultanmflpit..5-
—111=yLk =1, N (2)
where y( here denota the prct maximizing level d the production variable in question.
Finally,
y'(p,J)(y{(p,I)Jf(p1i)) asipplyfncticxn(mcanpo,sated)ef firznf.
We will assume that this fuxctkn like the demax fund on is diffen1iab]e.
C. Gownwnnt




t — (q —p),
;h (i.e. the sum of non—nurneraire consumption).




A tple tat cf the Paro Optimality d this equilibrium is to ask sstictht these exists a set cf
taxes, subsidies and lump sum dansfcr vdiith wtnld (a) leave housthdd utilities tnxhanged and (b)
ixreasegosanment revexiucs (assumed to be anuxnnl in numaire good). Ths, in turn, implies
6. As desaid so f& the tnt irnyxn, ct czxwse banan calibitnn rice wc. Hov.ever, ha*g zne that
pnbilizy, ft is dl wuth iin&igating Utwfare linØicatia dany euflibria v4ich emy edst. The se ftr this is
rr2de fuRy and rqzUiny li Scaneu (1980). We fl1 also ine the pthlan cI fr gcixk. Accambng ía them





competitive equilibrium utility levels,
11h,1/,1/, end9 arefimctior5cft andl,hasasduficnatz =O,ifthefnita1ex:pii1ibrium
is Paro Ctiita]. (This is a nsaq, but nct suffident, conditica for Pareto Optimality.)
To see vth fit last contim holds, note that aicng the anstraint ci equation (4),
(5)
dl hr
- changein lump sum inccne p tnt tharzge in lazY
Oiri
,enN'-demitvecwr,
[::} = [:; 1 (ith
suitably norrrialized), an N1'-
elenait vatcr.
But, dq/dt =N1+ tip/ti: (here 'N—i is an identity matrix). Therefcxe3 substhu&ig into (4)
and reananging tn 4eith,
7. This N-i dartsc is xxx acinvrria2l jivathe,tccthe, is m fwrtiarnl rdatihip tetwnrandI.Also,
is anhrjxrarx itich intlies epats (5).The dsbiats, 1b4ath,In, dianges in
tine ds1biicmaie asin to base toirnçn'i (21 1k icrairybassd4dCr ;f icr #ny frm. Ixiudir the impact d
thiaztn lintie dsmbtciardy icUsan ixane Ltd term to the x izdud term tiwd 1oa',
Stncrths w1d geady 4itt the inatci cn}nc 2)mgke.sic mture d the TeSUItS,thee tenshave ire-i
(a&tinysrnMt atvarily) içiS. aMtenañvdy. :L the &2ivatives dz (ar p and q) with rçea to tcan
sjewej asaI &rintht, wJdr€ izto acinctheassctaattt thanes in I,' as well as the thea efie cit.-7-
(6)
Next, substitution from epadors (1) and (2), sinmation wer all haiseholds and use cf the fact
that =1yields,
r+(c-yi=3+ [2lD(.1L2E d2')
Mn -= Iin any markS tü]ibñua Thercfat, along the ontaim (4),
Mitre the ecSny" impact ci the It! tar change, (i-fl dp Idi, has Ita netted cit.
Now, diff&enliatixig the cbjeclive funclicn (3) s4th respect to t ,wthtán,
(8) dr di H




th is the dethtvc cf R along &xfims in 'Much the cornpaisatial cüa&4&aint is satisfied. This
n be used as a measure ef the net dwnge in wdf are.
Fx the initial equilibrium to be P.O., dR lilt must equal zero at t =0, whith nplies that,-8-
(HhBt)_O (12)
Thus, Pareto Ctima1ity depot ciTheabsaice ci any z'svtiththange withtaxes and affect
dther prthts 'z housthdd utilities.
The defining characteristic d alatalit, which (hitraditional]anguage) tie"non-pecuniary'
and, therefat, justify sane fcnn d govmmem intervention, is that they aitutilityCTprcfit
fuxticnsinthe fam d the z-vañables. The %Briab!es involved may be teSned by the markel
interacddagaats (rg.averageproduct qualities, search 1imes avenge levels d imolervabk
effcrta, ithinccmplete markts, ftture pric), and indhidual agits may ban mly a neg]igib!e
impact m their levels. Nev1heis tth resulting equilibrium wifl be Pareto &effidem. As an
eaxiciy beams brreasing]y atcxnistic, the reducth impact d each iadisidual agt m the levd cf
the "external" variab1 is just counterbalanced by the increasing numb d cthers affted. This is
shown rigcrcxisly in Appendix I. Exct in the spedal ase (vdñth is unlikely to bcd generically)
flt ath B'aactlyr1 each cth ast, the etistesre cf ncapecuniaxy tatalities will
make the initial equilibrium. intent and guarantee the existence cf welfare impro'4ng tax
Furth&ma; eqtati (9) pro"ddcs a simple set d nssary wnthticw chaxactexizing the
cçthnal level dtaxes in the prcce ci atmialitia Since dR Ida'= 0is nnsary for tirnility,
cpcimal tax lewis hast the FF'Y that,
r fl—B' (13)
Taxes should be incrscd until the "ccvstantntC Jcss in tax rexcuc is aactly equal totim
marginalvalue ct the abatanazt in atmaiity geinathgactMties, serc "castam-ratC thartges
intaxes revmue arethethang in revmue that wculd have cccuxed at the existing tax nt
8. A trplc aaiqie ry hp darify mv tzigta-y d1s rule n S aliedp2cdce.A x as auo ua'iel that itsactidatswill always be ixivialiy trzfdth. lt'.'c'., sacitt x utreases wll ruiuce the renie id&d by
tietax (at cnn nt5). Tlttaxsinild r btaswrthis Vas in mtive aacdy toianc5 dr tmgü21 tnfi ct
rduaicm in cani acits m,-9-
flajjit d this papa is devcied to applying çuatic (12) in a variety d familiar welfare
situations.
IL Apllcztlozs
As noted in the introduction, the most fruithi] area for applying equation (12) is in the field cf
infomational atnliti. There are several reasa for this. First, infcrmatioxtal 1ernalitics are
almost invariably market-med laud in ¶he sise that they afft ailocatits indirectly twgh their
impact cimarkequilibña (e.& by affetthg the avenge quality d a bet oozenccus, but
thsdcnaUy identical, cunnnlity vbith ct&s the market place) ntber than theciiy thraigh the
impact d me agent cianotr.Therefrr; &stingtdslñng market mediated at&na1iti fran
tra&thmalIy p=iaiy m dttihe1zclarify what is atissue.Second, the. impact ct infcnmational
atnalid th includes amplicated trants which añse from changes h market equilibfla.
Ithng these ecuniaq" eff1stit theynet aitgreatlysimplifi the analysis. Third, the
welfare analysis d inf national cqth]ibria has bcn greatly cccç2icated by the vmiety 'f
irifamatiaI stuctr that are assumed Ccnstrained Pareto cçtima d many diff&t soils have
bern ax con1inue to be defin4 and thsavered. It sn useful, threfore, to ask a cimp1 question
namely, Ix a given izformaticn structure, are thee simple tax intavciticx3 thich vvifl improwe
tare in the cnxpa6cn ssc used here? Focusing Osconwensatai cbang5 h gosnnnl
revue(i.e. aId:) ailos*'sthis kind d question to be answS relatively easily and produc
pdicyczipticsMiith can then be based aichangcin thserab1e markd quantities.
Inthissection d the paper, simple maids d mans in&ventim are developel fcr advase
seIticn, sina1ling, insizanc; queue ratioing and imp!ete fisk mark cqyiiilria.
A. Atherse Sekctlon
flt simplest case in which the analysis can be applied is to markets with asymmetricaUy
ástribi.ed information and hetcgmcus quality. The basic model fcr these situations s
&vdapS by Akdof (1970). To simplify even we wJl asswne that thee is cnly a single
such csimtdity and that the are no cth atenaiki. Buyers will be assumed to draw xmom1y- 10-
franthe market in th the comctlity in question is ctfced icr sale, Seflers know the quality cI
tat they are selling. Buys know aily the avenge quality in the market as a vdtote. We v411
assn, in addition, that buyas are perfectly informed about and care cniy abnit the average
quality ci what they bay. Raiisticaflybuyas may also care about the range f pcsTh1e qualities,
bat taking this into accazm wtld dithge tt analysis 4rly in thiass ways and ww]d greatly
ixrtase its complexity? IS S denise the quality d each unit ci the hetercgois conmedJty, and 0
denae the awrage quality in the market place.
The real situaticn con' indingmctdce1y to this sitçle modd is a iabcr markS in wbich
firms hire blindly fran a —dworkers d hetacg&nis quality.
In tcs ci the male] ct tit paper, the z h cwtcrs si1i consist cf a single elemmi wlñcii is equal
to (although househoith 'itch do nct pmthase the commixilty may have du'IdzO).




hit these draimstar, equaticm (12) 1cr a small tax, dr, becrzncs
(14)
Sinir if frrreases and E decreases with 0, this rnmthatany intuvealkn tth increases
average quality in the mat place is benthdal. This, any small tax which ireases the quality d
the hetargenis azmmiity is always ba3efidalya
9. lIt simçie cr apj%es sally d1 to a tuaüm in t*h bsyas pirthase thy a limited autter ci ite ant r
aat dtindvidualqsalies death In that aite e'peted utlity (the açpcpriatetwifare Inre) lieet
m dt nnn aix! spr& cf the dstnhtcn cf "quaIit in the markec —.
9a A qniai that arise bee is td ag, thMng the cpersiaice ci pality ci wit trhaw in the zxmniw
tmbedIre. The nv, in getral, is in(SeeStiitz-Weiss, (1981), Srig½, (1976)). Bitthereare daair
in itththeywill, e.g. hm labcr is at a tut hinaghail, in whichdiet re a largensztr d ançtoyezs.
TI#n & supçly d labaus 1 te sextiaUy imaffnd by anysngefirm. Hare, a firm wit hate in wya
gein u d the wkn ug; and cnn cktain a norken ata lava wage.— 11-
Whatis surpxising about this result is its simplicity. The fact that an increase in 0 involves the
sale ci higher quality inputs by same households suggests the neth for a careful balancing ci the
increased cost ci these sales by avner households against the benefits to purchasers. Yet no such
alculation is iIIIpIiS by equation (14). The nessary balancing ci the costs ci selling higher
quality itcns is being done by ac households in the prrss ci madmizing utility. Changes in I
vbich result fran dianges in x 1! by owner households (in response to changes in the- market price)
are part ci the pecuniary imrct ci the original tax change. As such, they net ost. Ths accounts
for the simple farm ci the final pdicy prescription.
A tyica1 nak d tax changes leading to changes in average allity añses 'Miere different
ability groups have &fferc labor supply elasticities. If high ability xkes haw great supply
elasticities than Icv abiity workers, a small prqxirtiouate wage subsidy vAil increase average
quality.
Finally, it should be neted that there is, at least in pripl; an thservahle basis far judging the
tthes d gov-nment tax pdicy. Assuming that the average "quality" d labor entering a
partiaflar marks anbemaiitaed (slicrt cC determining the'Quality" d eachindividual worker)
by, far aaniple, taking a statistiol sample, any pclicy cC "small" taxes 'Much increase this quality is
a baida1 cne!t'
t SlgtSUng' SaeSng
lit question cC 'Miether a tax has benthdal or harmful effts an a signalling/screSng
equilibrium't an be addressed in a similar way. The principal difference is that signalling
10. A qietci that ttnalIy axis at this juncute is cit S axzptisatics req.dred by (4) cn act'tally te caniei ax
gisti S uiorrrat availakie to fir go.rnt. flr acit decent, in wnaturally, 01 cibat the gnrnrr lmats
S ectt to ciuith lww an mx are a'ozlab!e. If the ga'anxt is nsnicrS to catnnky taxes ant a unifc-m
keqitax and hiavs fit dzamactdaci eachci M dasses ci nnns (hit in the dass to 1th any çntic War
iSivithial Latp) then Pareto irqrtwing cennaSty taxes ciii in gawal, a& as big as the winter ci taxaUe
onnxEties strictly escM (i.eN>M).Lafit gnwezx resuict indi to tax thares tith keep oth class ci
cersanes, acqit the first, at a ghti lecd ci utility. As arule,fit ciii require M-1taxes (ate fri each ginip aceet
the fir&). fltn let fir gannrzt thaxe the tax ci a further cnncdry (say —1),zldng thmiltans thanes in
the M—1taxto lzq the classes ci i&nters at all their Øvai levd ci udhiry. If the aigimi ezpilThrium is in
P.O., Sn in general a 'aj.Ate tax change ci this nd ciii! cu cihich rais rarnie. This requir5 M taxes aM,
drrciare, M +1 canadties.
11. Sitalling1satng t&ibria invtht ruaa in citich thfrnmtim is on'.eye1 actively 'sellersaM/cr scught
activdv by biyers. The wadidaEl imdel ci this kind ci eqtntbñn a ecvdCpedSpeice (1973), Sdghitz (1975) cx
Rhild anl Stititz (1977) is actually Qst in slightly difereer terms than that çresetxai here In nut familiar
sesiais ci the rirrid Thins df çzice-quantlry ccnraas ihjea to sdf-selecn train. Tha dfficilry ciith usng12-
equilibria invdw, even in the simplest case,twoseparate qtality ladices, ca for those who acquire
a signal and a scan! for thoss who do not Let these be deniJ by O and 02 rcspecthvly and
assume that cnly firms are afftedtheir 'levels. Since signals arecostlyand wages must,
therefore, dçcid pitive!y ciisignals,we wifi assume that 01> 02.
Applyingequation (12), the net impact d a small tax dx is,
(15) I F
Asstuting that firms dnw at random from the pods d wcrkas with and without signals and that
the numbIfirms is large, this reduc appratircately to,
Sinceoil/nispcsitive (i.e.Han averageswrk quaiity leadsto higher profits), it follows
immediately that anytaxiEch increasesthe astragequalityinbcth the signallingandnon-
signalling — is benthdal. lit wwldbetnsecf atax tbdisccuragetrkets,t areItv
averageinthesignalling—butabove the average dthe ncn-signalling —, frcmacquiring the
signal, Again the simplidty d this ruIt follows frat the fact that many complicated "pecuniary
transfa effects are ignortd.
If the value ci higlrr 4uality to a fin is t1y propcrtional to the nmub& cf wcr]cas cia
particulartype that it its, then epadon (16) can be rewxittm as,
these rdds in e ptn rc is that they irrtuds tao stnte thpanures frut theusualfull-inimnatim An
Eta.' zr&I. Fimc, they en?xdy izrawlee idaxrntim ant this aspt d the jrotiem is. v.e hpe, caixurS i
fcrrnuiadaicidthper. Seconi, r &ist nxthathsra ax asscciat &fiithis dcpclibxiaued in dr
sigaiiixsatng ds dff fran d usual Wabitan famulacims (these thanges are largely rpniUe Icr t
xm-ociszmce gthL-xmin ant sigmllürzreb). Matar, fty dff in ways that rmke it àxpasbIe to tnk tI
"stall' agem. Nevttlts, it is gsUetoatytt arch cI this pr to aUhx/scrzix pThria ci dt
ussal sat (Nm-pwary atetalides arise teuse the aaaais d a't firm aiSt the se]i.sdeaimalmraintsd ie's).
Hnvey, icr tt sake cI mty ci jresezxaüct dn vaiiatn U dt g/scrteting cit wPJ za te dsoissed in
ts per.- 13 -
dR80i o802 a
(17) dtt a0 at
di 4)iag( n1Oq
—=tE—-i i—=— —s ,ao,F s11 aoj
n(isthenumberciwcrkscft)pei bfrel&yfzrrnf,n1 isthetotalfrumberctvivrkencflwei
8g(i aio,4
11furtha- assume that the otrall average quality ci the laba f& is vatted by the signal
and is fixed, then:
002oI &n1— —
Suhetitu&nfran this ccprsion into (17) yields:
(18)
The first tam in (18) captur the "sorthig" wiuc ci the signal. It is the irovement in quality in
tIe signalling —(i.e.801/at) multiplied by the diffntial value ci "qualItf for wcrkers from the
signalling compared to the non-signalling pci If "quality" is mae important for signalling wts
then this term will be psidve and, tirreicre, a tax which inses the quality tiThe signalling —
iilltmd to be beathcial. U thisun-ease in quality is athieved by xe&cing thenumber ci vtrkns
tsignai(i.e.OnjIat CO),tmsndtermin(18)willalsobepctitM(sbce$j —az> 0
and 011882> 0) and the tax Will be unambiguously benthdal (raneniber that this applies to the
se where overall avenge quality is czzlst2nt).
Furthermore, if there is m "sorting" (pure hierarchichal saeen!ng) cft (i.e.• 14 -
aj/a81 = a jIaOiJ,then
(19)
ath a snail tax itch it&c the amotmt ef signalling is beneficial.
Finally,if the ainal equilibrium inws no signalling (i.e.n1 =0),then (19) againapplies.
C. Mot HanS and Imvnax
In theasecf mcràl hazard arising from insurance contracts,an "1cna]itf arises because the
prothsdinsuraxefirms (at given ievds dpdicyprices) depend m an. undavaNe average levd
d xetakenby subscriber hcusebdlds. This couldbeinaifled directly,treating purchaserscf
imwnea3 a &tias 'Od"(similarto advasese1ticr) sithau average "quality" which in
Ut instance tu]d be the level d care ex&dsal in adding acck1entC.'2 Havesu, in an bsurance
situation, a strong ase can be made that the teclma]cgy d prorviding insurance is tharacterized lr
cinstai retir to scale and, as a result, the necessary dthntiv v&ich t&lie eiuaticn (12)
may not exist. Faztunatdy 'with CRTS, firms are an inseriiia1 part d the nxxleL The CRTS
t)mdogy anbesubsumzi dth into the lIOUSdICIdsta into the ncn.CRTS firms *hich
pride tI inputs to Ut CR18 tedmdogy. The fundamental ru1ts d the paper are act altered.
Modelling the insurar problem in this way pros4des a usu1 cppcrtuthty to show why.
Msunm fx thp1idty that the tmivse cf ixured ags consists ct iCicitiCalhouseholdsand
that a simlar level cf effcrt wbth rednc the tcf acddaitscannot be thsa by insurers. Let
baisth1th maximize,'3
E[U"(x,h, eh)],
12, The avral hazard issic maiwass far are than inszne prab.ent mrT1ycznixued. }bweve, the lminnce"
emçiecaptresdt tntlarrnal mnze d the issues icvdstd in thehde raie I zraal hazard pestin
13. Acci&u lasesre &ibsunri inthis fimcda,. This famulathi assunrs that d IrXIiVICIUaIcznün hizmdftoall rm
anuirecqaidtw pia m }amtgWtthere ciI1 be an acdt. CXxr rrstdts hid & iegewa
fatnulatiaL• 15.
nibject to the crnstraini tbat
q(x'—w") +(pfr,j3 _1h —ta' 1/s0,
F
wtct E here &wta an aptatkt acrs stata ci natures p!" is avtcrci huraixe jnymaits
acres stata ci natut (is i4.thefirst demait ci 0,isthe ymmt made to bc*sse&,ld
I, instate&nature1),p(,i) istumdfawne(tüthmaydepaidwx',but
dis ituation is tcrftd at iaigth ltaw), 1'isitt lest] ci "care" aerciscd by Inistid Is and
is the "averagC Ievd ci re cwcised by all lniseldth, is:
i=-fr
andh is the irdvi&ial aidcn'mrt seat
With anEtaS returns to scale in the inance industzy and tisk rt*stral inststors equffibrium in
the imwaire industry ili:
2,i)=E(pPJ?)
(the_COhtrCtfl.c, eqgi4rtwa d
This eat be substituted into the btsthcid hidgd cusstza?int so that lnisthdt thrue x!I gjph
A.
at wmaxini7aE[&'isubjt to the traint:
q.(x..wh) +E(t[e) _,h—p 'if s OF
p
wherethe fiixdm E n be treated as a rica] utility fimctia.
For a nafl tax, di,thedmnge in maximum ptS utifity fcr an indisidual lxwtild is,"
dE[CJh] dl—dE(pfrfldi
di [di di. di di di
Mc is the marginal ptul utility ci irtcrce to &xisthdd h. In crder to irnire that
14.Thsis te pr6al tt'miw cf dr Upangian nith rjzudi•ntithetails a nigkfaward awEca&n d S
ewdc3xttaca• 16.
household Ii suffs no net las in utility,
iL_(wh_xh)a_Eakr
d'r/dE(pfli) •g
dt drF di di dt
Summing aer all hOUSthCISandapplying the same simplificatiais used in Sectkn I above, the net
impact pa unit cf tax, d:, is
Hdi di
Since dE (is's fl/dishouldbe negative (more care reduces imurance payments), any small tax
which btreases bousethid dfixts at azddt avoidance wifi imprcwe svlfare. Mcrecwer, lit net
soda]value ci tim tax change is just equal to t reduction in pted level ct casualty iasuiaxc
pamiits.Again this is an thsvab1e wiequxe agaimt vbith the d&iory iia tax thtemtnlia
on be mrasurS.
This axiclusion rum ccxmtc to the cnntthSl idea that competitive insuzarice markets aight
not to be inttfaI with as Icg as a onpditive equilibrium S5t3 (see for example, Shaw1
(1979)).However, in mt d these mcdds, tb iasurance industry is consthuted so that ixsetcf
tarn n alter the ks'S d ore. Shying why this CXaixs reveals a grt deal abait the ajnpriate
role d gov&nt intcivticn
If we assume that imu?ance osts on be made todepeida the crcpletevwtor1 household
anuxnption, equilibrium in a ccrnpitive insurance industry ifl imply that,
y(pft,xh,.j) =E(p,i(x),xh)
te the c in queslicni is ncxv that d bousehoith 'iidth consumption vector x 'sixe the
haisehoich txntinde a separate insurar dass. thd these ccuxfitiais, Ut cost cl insurance tat
in the net sccial imjnct apresdon i]] be,
15. Ncre that as r diaries. the cçxin1 piicy, t, 1 change, bit'by theewdcçe checrern, this dir tçs cz.- -17-
dl?= :sdE(pji(xh))____
dtHdi di
t'e xIl is bdng held constant as taxes thange. However, if taxes do not affectx' then they will
.notaffte'
Therefix; where insurance premia are aiali&nS cn x tax interventions will not be able to
improve overall cozimnwelfare16The ultimate pclicy aitim is wtiether insurance firms can
mat iSvidual Kucebid consumption levels or whether it is t icr the govnnent to concJ
aerall ammpdon levels via tan'7
D. IncnnMe Markets
An aiany witbait a full set ci Arrow-Dtcu contingent cornmcdity markets is me in stcb
many annmothties are cxnipcsities in the same way that a draw from a labor —cihetercgns
quality is a onite. When d,Anes in demand diange market pxics, the nature ci the cinpcthe
product will then thange As aresult,althcugh the ixtcn ci "quality" is no longer unamhiguous,
nall tax intervtnticm will Alrnnct invariably aist sthith can improve an original market allocation.
The initial a]locatiai is net, therefore, a Pareto cptimmn. The recunent cbscoveiy ci this kind ci
inefikiency shaild ifl cnntinue to be a surprise.18
A simple maid ci the phnrvmaicn imthed is me with two pexioch. Asswne, that, in pericxl
two, the state ci nature may take on me ci k value. Assinne further that there is a single store ci
value, denctul goal zero, whe. price in paid two depench on the state ci nature %st1ich
materializes at that dmeP Let ann-dinwnionalvtcr s = (s ,s)&ncte the. price ci the
stored value 9ood in tens of the numeraire good in each of the period two
16. tr aigimi cneitht uilibiii smy LIII ax be Paiuo dhiet, bit cnnnxlry nx wilL ax hdp. Par a
tharaeizaüm d S qtl x pdicy sArncuaidStigiitz (1981).
17.Atnilar bit siigbdy r canicatS amlt caii be applied to the ackene ttiai case reatui xIie
18. Mu dse zuitreitdsca.as cI dispktnitrriitnLoaandZeckhause (1981).
19. Are cantiticnal apprcsch wuild S to fdlow flaznaxi (1967) aM Stigiitz (1972), tibo assn that the inve&trtrc
—yiddsa ranthn renirn. If thee at grcunS f gtinr iaaveeiai in the rr rauictive nt&1 used hre (in
d rea1 renna to the inwsnwr —isfrced at zero), then there are ztain1y gromth fa gatrment
hreweitiai in the rre general nnd.18 -
statesof nature.The value of thisvectorwill depend upon market condi-
tions in period two which depend, among other things, on prices and the aflount
of the good zero produced in period 1.If the store—of value good is the
cnlyitemcfcailtal,thata household's apteJ utility atthebenSg cf period 2. depends atits
ho]dings1x. ci this —at thatthneajxithevtcr ctpxices,s. Fureachx8 ands,thcreis a
fuirtim V'(xs) bithdesthbes the zzaxinvirn expected utility cf housdacid h in peziczl 2. For
czxtazss, j'h nbe writtai;
hit .th 1a. V(x0;s)
k
where bk is the probability that state k matthaflzect The wftx x is the consumption which
mzathetnilutyilhctsethldh duxingpeiiod2bstatek. Tthttthtomaximize4(x)
subject to the ccnstraint that
Sx0x
thereI here denctes the lump ram hxaiie d hctsthdd h phs iZ sales ci the numahe —in
statek inpaicñ2.
linking forward fran the girrr±igcf paiod1, we will asswne that a housthdcFs tsm poicd
apected utility is the sum tilts apected utilities in period 1 andpexicxl2 separately. Formally:
4(xt,x;s) ut(x) +v"(4; s) (20)
xdemses anzumption paic 1.Housebolds shc4d maximize this two pedod apected
utilitysubject to the usual idget anstraint.
Now wnthd the impact cf a small change in period I prices. It will lead to a zeadjustinait in
paled 1 consum,tiai wine ts will S cut. In additicn, IL will 1d to change in Ufll x0
pirchased,bythis mms,tothanginthe vectors.Inqiatim(20), thevtorsmtezsthe
overaflutility fwrticn cbrtly as a kind d awnaflty. Like the quality variable in the advse
seIwai aample it describes the "canjxsiüon" d a ticket in a icttay. In this instance, the Icttay
is a suequent value lcttuy instead c(aqua]ity lctteiy. This changes in the 'priceCs are non-
pecuniary atffmlid nthu than pniary temaiiths h the traditional sse.- 19-




where xisthe marginal utility ci inecine to household A in state k.Therefore,in general, taxes
l]l ernst which vill imprat overall welfare. Models which alude ciliate (e.g. Tharücnd
(1967)) typically impose anñticns wider iiñch ds/dt =0 or householt arc indifferent to the
pattern ii pica wIIth crcurs across states ci nature (i.e. av1Vas =0).For erample, Diamcnd
(1967) achieves this by having aily a single —sothat 'k =Ifor all k wider all drcunastances.2°
lit coaticns insolved arc vay special ma.
When infatuation is iiupedeci and seaxth (fransacdcris) are costly, the beir5ts and mts ci
aitering a mat thai depend cn variables ciher than price. For instance, the return to a worker
aitaing the labor markct depaxis bcth on the length ci time that he has to search far a job as l
as the wage he receives once he is anplc'ed. And the length ci time that an individual has to
search depexis on the search activities ci ether individuals.
Similarly, in product markets, firste first served apeues then serve to balance supply and
dnnarwl• The laigth ci the oyeue may again depend on the actions ci ether firms and individuals?'
!Inbotheasatlmreisana:ta.nality The question is whether these externalities re-
suit in markets being pareto! efficient. We now show how these external-
ities can b analyzed using the framework of this paper.
4
20. Gmsns tnt uthich &Ids -O have &ti idetffi by Stiglicz (1982), It cati&n a tuatim in th the
tnd-value gtrid yidds a rartn inn in nte k. Then, if &rtd icr the stcre'd-value —isCcbbDcag1as, its o1 'value is ia1epaxi ci the e s aS ontmns are iSiffr to the partn ci a pica aaas ntes ci
21. Similar atcnalitie arise tkien firr tarn bear n curt cEde thing and raiSng cs ci lathiduals, and individual
qñt rats Sjzid ci the aicis ci criw frzm. Still cthe search euenaliti3 tith rmy te aml)ni tisn a
fraxrntrk me dxse ntce dz tharacaisa (quality) ci ind;iduals arriving at a &m are affed by the çotica ci
Ser fin•20-
Inthisseticn, we investigate queue ratiminga. 9crz example in this category.Thereasons fa
lwkingatqueues are tluw-fdd.First,they have nct becn investigated as thoroughlyesSearch
uilibña?2 Second,thestructureefthentx!elsisquitegena1. And,thirdqueue raticnJng
equilibriumusefullyillustratethe s cf circwnstanccs inI1thcompetitive equilibria are Pareto
ent in ways 'with mcst comtntionai srch models do not.
Again,to facilitate the apcticn, t will use a ny mp1e modd. Let theit be a singjegocd,
sutscript 1, producS by a single facta, subscript 0. Assuim that the factor, referredtoas labor, is
ineiastiolly supplied and is the iiugeajre. The "gwC is supplied in N separate marks iMS
I =1,... N in each cf whith firms guarentee a thffnt waiting time. Let,
—umupricecft1moarinn1ari4i=1,"'N,q(qj, ''qN)
RIothwiinm&kdi=1,"N,
7, • averagewaitingtimeforconsumersinmarkdi=1 N,T =(T1, '•TN).
Each cf the i markets are Sumcd to be cnpedtive with Ink &ms and zms tattg prica as
give; and consumcs taking waiting times as given.
Hcusehthh ifl be assumed to thith up thdr ixwthases among litsevaaimzi]nLa,
—(xt,4)—ao!purcfiasesbyhouscho1dh
H
Haiselwild utility ll be assumed to depend atxh and,dso, iniplidtly cithewaiting time
aswciatedisithxh. j
uh(xIT,w_p;?,Lr?)a utilityfunctioncfbouscholdh,
w —totalsupply d mbalabcr inccxnc,
V.An exception is Trmian Belwely'sunpublished paper,"Equilibrium Theory
withTransactionsCosts.". 21.
L non-worked hours?3
Firms procbice the single goal subject to the constraint that they meet the specified waiting
times for their market segments. Let,
• labcrcbvtedtoproducticmctaxtputbyflnnf1, ''F,
-labordesvted to handling queue tnnnhers,
-Lf(y{)aLaborrecpñrementfusticndfrnfpro±scingy{ tmitscicnput.
aQ(T,,.y{) aFunctkncW5nirig the service labor required by finn ftosupply an
cutputy{ with awaiting timer1.
Msuining, for simplicity, that each firm participates h cnly me markets profits far friii fare,
I pjy{—(L-1'(y{) +Q"(Tj,y{)).
Profits are maximized ocr a chrilce Cf attput, y{, and the market I (characterized by {pj, T1}) in
which the finn dicxrn to participate.
Anequilibrium set Cf prices equates supply and dent'M in eadi Cf the markets (wa igecre, as
always, aister prothms). The atem to which this equilibrium involves 'eaI" aternalities
depends m the form Cf the cpiaie service funoticn, Q1.
The simplest alternative is to essume that each finn makes available y{ units d cutput at the
begirming Cf each market paicd. Qistaners line upto pwthase a single staMard tnt size each
Thus, letting the standard size be 1 cit ci Yi firm Ieanapect y( custoruffs. These mtst be
serviced in Zr1tits d time whichrequiresa service nt;
—savicerateforfirmf=y{I2Tj.
Thissersicente Cf asstoms per ttt time will determine the led d service labor. Lets
23. Waitii tixrts T cit te assnS m lx rates çer units cznurS utich implies that there is aaxazd at giartity.
Also thice T represem 'arage" waiting times, we sll1 asswrt that anwr are nsk uaat wnh rea variatia,S
in waiting time araind fit arage.•22-
the senice rate attainedby yf0units ct Iabcr.
Then
Q'iy{,T,)crt4(y{12T,).
Aqueueservice fuirtim ci this nd ccntains no z-varialt and hence no "real" at'naliti
Thus, tttCOIIIpeUtIVe afloatiaiwill be irrrminietoPardo impmving tax intesvenücms?4 Omue
timesan observable quality variables and by themselves do not lead to in-
efficient market allocations.Because firms can control their queue lengths
by controlling output there are no non—pecuniary externalities.
However, aS models which are chnctexized by such atnilt caneasilyte tcribes±
Assinne, icr exampl;thatlevdsd mtput, y{, and prices are thermi bthre the beginning d
eachmark pthod. Befcre gcing to a maiket, inzlisiduals know the price and the aptS queue
lgtb; cmiy after they go toa market do they 1rn the qurn 1gth assodated with each particular
frna 'within the market. Assume, that hOUS&CIthappearranthnly thraiglnit the m&k pericd
aril join the shortest qunie withnthemaxthbelcngingtoa firm tkce unsddaatput aceedsthe
demaix! cf caans already in line. Queue length far any particular wxxlor will depend aithe
queues facing cther vendcn. As a result, service mtreqtñredtomeet thestandardapected
waitingtime, fl,iBdepad m The que lengths cf t arms stch depaid, in turn1 cii their
seiMcc nt. In a market equflibtiurn withrepeatedpaicth and actualsavkevcsU ccpialling
apatedam, tim profit fincticm Cf meEmcan be wñttm,
PaYT(1J(y{)+Q(T,,y{, i&))
24.The finnisrn,cirrse, rllyrethctS m thaiz cnly those pfr aid senice Ievds (q.taze Ieigth) dfa'ei by t
fizzm. An implicit asswnpücn ciaw am1ysis that there dxs ax aistany ahff(p.F)anbinarimthichstuild
puthased by iañi&sS (givei the a1ua d p aix] Tin tnrkas) ath aich that, atthe qsantizi dexmnded, the
firmmak a ptfit.-23-
-vectorci the service labor iiçuts ci uher finns (ett inchxng frrmf).




Moreaer, the apprcpriate recticn ci govanmit pdicy can readily be dctermined by aaniining
the impact ci taxe w the service burdem ci firms?5
The range ci pcsthble models, including those in ccosumers bear aternality related
waiting cats, gos far beyond the simple variaños described here. This brief discossirm is not in
any way intended to be definitive. What should be dear, however, is the value ci the underlying
framework for assssing rapiy the welfare implicaticr ci differert queuing cx search formuiaticns.
ILL Cairht
This paper developed a general mhcxkio2J within vbith a wide range d market mediated
atcna1iti n be amlzed. Inconcluding,lxx aspects ci air analysis should be strsed.
First, the reasoim that pecuniary ternalitis can be ignored in ft ig.ttetecmjego far
ttyccd fit coiñthn that eathindividual has a negligible impact at prics. Smd, crimpethive
market cncrthes with ircftrfxt infcr±ation (whether this gives rise to adverse sdecticn, ignalling
and scrning, or moral hazard problems) and incomplete marks MU be tharacterized by vbat we
bait identified as market-meiatth externalities, ci a kind 'tth result in the market equilibrium
being pareto irffxt. ( the csher hand, there are sine drcumstaxas in which the presice ci
queues dos ad, in itself, imply that marks are inefficient. Thrd, the pec'imiary tts can be
identified and eliminated in many vtifare calalatioi by the rigorous and repted applicaticn ci
the etvelope theorem. Finally, ding this, and apprrcbing many informational externalities (as
25. It slndd te d that this is the thatte in rcict wz atoncmt opz ttt thath'e thaste in cette ans.24.
astarnaEties arising wi ci oxily transactcrs, queues, cc) likestandard noa-pecuniary
cctnalities mables aieto identifyboth the apprwriate &ectkn ci çolicy intex-venticgi and
cbsavable msmes ci their succsM applicatica.Ah1
In crder to investigate fit nature if petmiaiy atana]itie in the tradlitional sise, the natural
starling pdnt is to nnmine the impact if a small .'balaxS budget" shift in aces &mantl?' Let,
di0a.(ds?,dst5,
ds? —qds°-' sliftncWnMfatlmimnwairegacd,
is0-(N—1) vwtaif shif&in thnnt far the N-1nwnerthe goads.
litshift,iT0, may be ascribed dUnto'ashift in the danardifa tglo-lnssehdda to Cy if a
trwInadicid.An analcgais shift with is? —p is0 couldbedtdandascribedtoa th&ige
inttviabytheSvcsertfrmn
Assuming taxes are wchanged, the resiltiag change in markd —is,
tip'dq=F'ds0,
I —--- lj,k =2, NIacr4an if then if n-msmafreexcess dmiands.
L!Pkdq j
Wcaswme that the aceS dnni fwrtica are dfrtiable and that I is imsiflgt at the
••-_
Thechange in ixotne cessary to maintain the utility la1 cihzistildIs in the face if a
dumge in price tip dq is,
26.02yIaxSba tie rzmke seese Utareccai&irç dirges in cqullibiiwn afloadn. Anwf,alanrSgift in
ess dnnd wald peda die Snxr €1 a wquøibrua
27. Since 4 -dajin dr peshtaiice,ft imka newtalk abn dt aCCtiaC tintticrk dt peatq vtas
sqarardy.A-2
=E:+E4c+*]_a'1kA*÷*))
Summhig overall lxnneMth aid ztagthzing that4=yt, E=?',Ia" =1 aid
H
/ =h idthatotalischangein govatment ixrane rç—--tion,
HP H P qF Ii' dq








Thisrepresenb the is social imrct d the ithtial dirge in pri aid, thus, the eainiarf
28. tIe aprScn in ut (An)Mcwipu3de arunaIitigrand ty thar in nswz$t that 15uk hue ____
•inrneBSCS.Thisisza tietecawe the diai in qunimartitgliglUe. Th4r an
rtghgWtPt ft isthe ad keqtg track ci tait related ereliSs th ath peaty te zrzadnl
bzxdrs vitinit affiii de talc aibnte ci S a1yth, Fcr ñgcr •n ould aatn that (1) wiiwtptian ant
po±icthx ci S amtthn —gntam anlin and (2) lnthd axe cutstSd so n Sir
cnenradngallaarrtci S nnaire gtS. Also 'e assn St the aiz*I di tft Mfex tz.ttA- 3
afllityV associated with aiginal diange in drrinM ds.
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3.Ths t t b S —-dthe Sm d S pçe inSt the &/dp,drldq rm 4ffe fran S
tithe bxly ci S .ltnvvu,in tvth ,vttn1liSswill r ntt Mt &lw, ijandEt at zeofa
aft lnSidth and fins Mt S z s ataffted by diange in nrrlzt pices (t ósa we fatitoss). If
dz'/dt a dztI& we zert th n a rule (dz"/dp '+d/Jdq) and (dz*Idp +d?fdq) will te mi-zn This
(again in gal), S cmlidn tat with —n1d m P& irnpirg aWraflum axe jrisely aWithpeoitharf euntis d, in atBffiUOG9Apuy
Akerlaf (1970), G., 'The Market for Lemons: Qialitative Uncertainty and the Market
MediSsm," Quarterly Journalc/Economics, LX)OCIV,84,288-300.
Arixtt, it. and Stig]itz (1981),J.,'Moral Hazard," Unpthlished Manuscrift
Bewicy, Truman, tqui]ibrium Theory thTransacdcnCcsts," forthccrning manuscript.
tiamcS (1967), P., 'The Rde Cf a Stock Market in a General Equilibrium Model WIth
Talmdogical Uncertainty," AmericanEconomicReview, 57,759-776.
I)ianiaid (1979), P. and E Mas]dn, "An Equilibritun Analysis d Search and Breach Cf Contract, I:
Steady State," Bth Journal 1 Eccixta, Vd. 10, Na 1, pp. 282-318.
flanacnS, P.. and McFadden (1974), D. L., 'Sane Uses d the Expenditure Function in Public
Fm;" Journal ofPubliCEconomics, 3,321.
Dixit (1979), A, "Rice Changes and Cktirmim Taxation in a Many Ccnswner Econany," Journal
of Public Economics, 11.143157.
Harberger (1964), A, "Measurnnent cf Wast;" American Economic Review, 54,58-76.
Harberger (1971), A, "Three Pcstu1at icr Applied Welfare Eczinathcs An bnewretative Essay"
Journal c/Economic Literature, Vd. 9, No. 3, 785-797.
Lipsey, R and Lancasta (1956), IC., 'The General Theory d Second Best,?' Review of Economic
Studies, 24, 11-32.
lining, L and Zecjtha'u.sa (1981), R, "Peciniary Externalities Matter When Ccntingent Oairns
Markets Are Itnuiplete," Unpu Wished Paper, Han-aid University.
Martensen, (3979), D., 'The Matching Pmccss as a NmCo<perative Game", Nczthwtern Math
Ccater Thscizsion Paper, No. 284.
Newbery, B. and Stiglitz'(1982), J., "The Choice Cf Th±rique and the Optimality d Market
Equilibriwn With Rational Expectations" Journal of PoWical Economy, VcI. 90, No. 2,
223-24 6.
Rather, R nd Stig]iiz (1976), J., "A Ncn-Caicavity in the Value Cf Informaticn," Dept. Cf
University d CJiforrña, BakSey.
Rahctild, M. and Stiglitz (1977), L, "Equilibrium in Canpetitive Insuraire Markets An Essay cn
the Economia d Imperfect Information," Quarterly Journal ofEconomics,XC, 90, 629-
650.
Shavell (1979), 5., 'On Moral Hazard and Insurance," Quarterly Journal ofEconomics,XCIII!, 93,
541-562.
Spence (1973). E, '7thMarketSignalling," Quarterly Journal qf Econom its, LXXXVII, 87, 355- 374.
Starrett (1980), I). A, 'Measuring Externalities and Second Best Distcrticns in the Theory d bra!
IPublic Coois," Eccn,mndca, Vd. 48, No.3, 627-642.
Sdglitz(1972),1. E., "On tin OpthaJity ci the Stck M2Iket Mocaticn ci Investment," Quarterly
Journal f Economics, LXXXVI,86, No.1,55-72.
Sdglitz (1975), J. E, "flue Thecry 'd Screethig E&catim and the tXstributioa d Inccme,'
American Economic Review, Vd. 65, Na 3,283-300.
Stiglitz (1982), L 11, 'The Ir.effideiry ci the Stock Market ETA1ThrIWn, Review q( Economic
Studies, XLIX, 241-261.
Sdglitz, (1970, J.E, Prices and Queues as Screttg DScts in Ccmpeiithe Markets," ]MSSS
th. repcrt no. 212, Stanford 11th.
Stiglitz1 JE. and Weiss, A (1981) "Credt Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Infcrmation1"
America's Economic Review, Vd. 71, no. 3,393.410.